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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Co; - - •-o '"nd'-r 
Con*- f ^  ^ nb-lG (l^bLM. The decis.iou of m e iJi.ii- ^ un-. • 
Commission is fi na1„ 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I Whether i latural gas purchaset ^uostar 
Pipelii le to fi lex its pipeline compressors it Ui <xi J_S s.iDJo«r. ;o use 
tax? 
A. Whether such taxation is vn-ia',i.r' "iimerce 
Clause of the- United States Constitution? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case comes before the ni p; < m* - r^ -tit i-n 
I'M K^view from proceedings before r.ho Ut.ah Suate Vax Commrss . < i-
( "Commission * ) . 
The case i nvcnlves-*- a clajhi . \ * - -;,:> - -•' 
pui. chases < i natural qas to fuel i ts Titan compressor laciiiLnrS a n 
exempt from Utah state use .> ea^s* m-rat: on has been preempted 
by the Commerce Clause ol the United States ., ra-
Th<j i.'oi;---'• ' - . : i.ssued Findi ngs of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Final Decision on Aprr• • ;; that Petitioner 
1 
was subject to use tax for its consumption of natural gas purchased 
from out-of-state sellers. Attached as Appendix A. 
The Petitioner seeks a review of the Commissions' 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The present matter involves the construction of the 
following statutes. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(c) (1987): 
(1) There is levied a tax upon the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(c) Gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or 
other fuel sold or furnished for commercial 
consumption. 
2. Utah Admin. R865-21-16U: 
A. The fact that tangible personal property 
is purchased in interstate or foreign commerce 
does not exempt the property from the tax if 
the property is stored, used, or otherwise 
consumed within this state after the shipment 
in interstate or foreign commerce has ended. 
B. The fact that tangible personal property 
is used in this state in interstate or foreign 
commerce following its storage in this state 
does not exempt that storage of the property 
from tax. The fact that tangible personal 
property is used in this state in interstate 
or foreign commerce does not exempt the use of 
the property from the tax. 
? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The parties 
entered into a stipulation of facts« Attached as Appendix B. 
1. Questar Pipeline Company, ("Petitioner"), is a Utah 
corporation engaged in the transmission of natural gas. 
2. Petitioner owns and operates an interstate natural 
gas pipeline system in Utah, southwest Wyoming, and northwest 
Colorado. Petitioner also conducts natural gas gathering, 
transmission, and storage in the aforementioned states. 
3. Petitioner purchases a significant portion of its 
natural gas outside of the state from field producers and pipelines 
in Colorado and Wyoming for resale in Utah. The gas that is 
purchased is transferred into Petitioner's pipelines at out-of-
state locations and pumped through its lines by several gas 
compressors. 
4. Petitioner owns three underground natural gas 
storage reservoirs in Utah. The reservoirs are the Chalk Creek, 
Coalville, and Clay Basin reservoirs. 
5. Petitioner's also owns and operates several 
compressor facilities located within Utah for the transmission and 
underground storage injection of the natural gas. The compressor 
stations located in Utah are the Fidlar station (a mainline 
compressor facility), the Clay Basin storage compressor, and small 
compressors associated with the Coalville and Chalk Creek storage 
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compressors. These compressors are fueled by natural gas which is 
diverted directly from the flowing qas in Petitioner's pipeline 
system to the engines that run the compressors. 
6. By Statutory Notjce of Deficiency, dated June 27, 
1988, the Auditing Division of the State Tax Commission of Utah 
( Respondent") , imposed a use tax on Petitioner for the gas 
consumed by the compressors located at Coalville, Fidlar, and Clay 
Basin for the period July 1, 1984, through June 30, 1987. 
1
 . Petitioner pard the deficiency under protest 
alleging that the gas consumed by the compressors is not subject to 
sales and use tax rn Utah because the Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution prohibits the state from imposing tax on the 
use of natural gas ir_ interstate commerce, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(c) (1987) provides: 
( 1 ) There is levied a tax on the purchaser 
fci the amount paid or charged for the 
fol]OWJng: 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, 
or other fuels sold or furnished for 
commercial consumptjon. 
Pursuant to this statute, the Petitioner is 
obligated to pay a use tax for its consumption of natural gas 
purchased from out-of-state suppliers. Notwithstanding the 
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statute, Petitioner contends that Utah is precluded from imposing 
the use tax on them because the tax violates the Commerce Clause of 
the United States Constitution. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, provided 
a four part test in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 
274 (1977), that supports the Respondent's position that the 
imposition of a use tax is not contrary to the United States 
Commerce Clause. The test for taxability is: 
1. Is the activity that is taxed sufficiently 
connected to the state; 
2. Is it nondiscriminatory with reference to 
interstate commerce; 
3. Is the tax fairly apportioned; and 
4. Is the tax fairly related to the benefits 
provided? 
Id. at 287. 
Relying on Complete Auto, the evidence in the present 
case, demonstrates thai:: (1) the Petitioner's activity is 
sufficiently connected to the state to justify the tax; (2) the tax 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce; (3) the tax is 
fairly apportioned; and (4) the tax is fairly related to the 
benefits provided to Petitioner by the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT 
PRECLUDED BY THE U.S. COMMERCE CLAUSE FROM 
IMPOSING A USE TAX ON PETITIONER FOP PURCHASE 
OF NATURAL GAS FROM OUT-OF-STATE SELLERS. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-32-103(1)(c) (1987) states: 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for 
the amount paid or charged for the following. 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel, oil, 
or other fuels sold or furnished foe 
commercial consumption. 
Pursuant to this statute, the purchaser (Petitioner) is 
liable for payment of use tax on the amount paid to the out-of-
state seller. The Tax Commission has statutory authority to impose 
a tax on the gas purchased to operate Petitioner's compressors. 
Notwithstanding the statutory authority for the use tax, 
Petitioner argues that the Commerce Clause of the United States 
preempts the state's power to impose the tax on Petitioner's 
purchases. It is the Respondent's position, however, that 
taxation of the fuel purchased by the Petitioner from out-of-state 
sellers is consistent with the Commerce Clause. In support of this 
position, the Respondent Cites Utah Admin. R865-21-16U which 
states: 
A. The fact that tangible personal property 
is purchased in interstate or foreign commerce 
does not exempt the property from the tax if 
the property is stored, used, or otherwise 
consumed within this state after shipment in 
interstate or foreign commerce has ended. 
B. The tact that tangible personal property 
is used in this state in interstate or foreign 
commerce following its storage in this state 
does not exempt that storage of the property 
f com the tax. The fact that tangible persona] 
property is used in this state in Interstate 
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or foreign commerce does not exempt the use of 
the property from the tax. 
In this case, Petitioner purchases the gas from out-of-
state sellers. The natural gas is then transported through 
Petitioner's pipelines oy use of compressors in Utah. A portion of 
the gas is consumed by Petitioner's compressors. The mere fact 
that the gas was purchased out-of-state and subsequently shipped in 
interstate commerce does not exempt the purchase from use tax in 
accordance with Utah Admin. R865-21-16U. The portion of gas that 
is consumed in Utah after its journey in interstate commerce is 
subject to Utah use tax. To construe the Commerce Clause as does 
Petitioner would preclude taxation by the Respondent of any product 
or article that moved in interstate commerce. Where a portion of 
the natural gas is purchased for the specific purpose of operating 
compressors within the state of Utah, Petitioner is obligated to 
pay a use tax on the purchase for the portion consumed by 
compressors within the state. 
The controlling case in this area is Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). In that case the 
Supreme Court of the United States set out a four pronged test to 
determine a state's taxing power. The Court held that a tax will 
survive a Commerce Clause challenge when: 
(1) The tax is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State; 
(2) The tax is fairly apportioned; 
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(3) The tax does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce; and 
(4) The tax is fairly related to services 
provided by the state. 
Id. at 280. 
The present case clearly satisfies the four tests 
provided by Complete Auto. Petitioner, at page eleven of its brief 
states: "In this, there is no significant disagreement that three 
of the four Complete Auto criteria that would permit the tax are 
met. The case revolves solely around only the first of these four 
test, the nexus test:" The Respondent also agrees that the nexus 
test is the only test that is in dispute. If this test is met, the 
assessment is proper. 
IS THERE SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS? 
Contrary to Petitioner's contentions, the United States 
Supreme Court has established a relatively low threshold for 
proving sufficient nexus with a state for taxing purposes. The low 
threshold is demonstrated by successive cases handed down by the 
Court. As far back as 1939, che United States Supreme Court held 
that an out-of-state firm can be compelled to pay use tax despite 
the fact that the foreign company mere]y operated through sales 
agents in rented offices. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher et 
al. , 306 U.S. 6 2 (1939). Perhaps more significantly, the Court 
found sufficient nexus in Scripto Inc. v. Carson Sheriff, et al., 
362 U.S. 207 (1960). In that case Scripto had only ten 
representatives within the state of Florida who solicited orders 
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for Scripto; thereafter, the representatives forwarded the orders 
to the Corporation's Georgia headquarters. The company had no 
office or general place of business in Florida, nor did they have 
any full time employees or property. Yet, the Court found 
sufficient nexus to subject the corporation to a Florida Use tax 
statute. 
More recently, in National Geographic Society v. 
California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977), the Supreme 
Court held that the "Society's continuous presence in California in 
offices that solicit advertising for its magazine provides a 
sufficient nexus to justify that State's imposition upon the 
Society the duty to act as a collector of the use tax." Jjd. at 56 2. 
The court in National Geographic based its decision on the fact 
that the Society maintained two offices within the state by which 
it solicited mail order merchandise from California residents. 
In 19 88, the Court decided D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. 
McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988). In that case, a taxpayer challenged 
a Louisiana use tax imposed on the taxpayer's delivery of catalogs 
produced and delivered Jirom outside the state. The taxpayer 
contended that it did not have sufficient nexus with the state of 
Louisiana to justify the imposition of the use tax. The 
Court disagreed holding: 
Holmes ordered and paid for the catalogs and 
supplied the list of customers to whom the 
catalogs were sent; any catalogs that could 
not be delivered were returned to it Holmes 
admits that it initiated the distribution to 
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improve its sales and name-recognition among 
Louisiana residents. Holmes also has a 
significant presence in Louisiana with 13 
stores and over $100,000,000 in annual sales 
in the state. The distribution of catalogs to 
approximately 400,000 Louisiana customers was 
directly aimed at expanding and enhancing its 
Louisiana business. There is "nexus" aplenty 
here. 
Id. at 32-33. 
More significantlyr the Court held in D.H. Holmes that: 
Complete Auto abandoned the abstract notion 
that interstate commerce "itself" cannot be 
taxed by the States. We recognize that, with 
certain restrictions interstate commerce may 
be required to pay its fair share of state 
taxes. 
Id. at 30. 
Petitioner has sufficient nexus to justify taxation by 
the state of Utah. Petitioner is a Utah corporation that is 
actively engaged in operating a natural gas business in the state. 
Moreover, Petitioner is responsible for a vast network of pipelines 
spanning the state of Utah. Given rhe significant contacts with 
the state of Utah, it is of litrle significance that the natural 
gas purchased by Petitioner for the purposes of fueling its 
compressors is diverted from interstate commerce. The fact is that 
Petitioner is purchasing out-of-state natural gas which in part is 
used to fuel machinery located within the state of Utah, and 
therefore is statutorily responsible for payment of the use tax. 
Petitioner's substantial "presence" in the state clearly satisfies 
the nexus requirement: as set cur by Complete Auto. There rs no 
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rationale as to why Petitioner should not pay its fair share of use 
tax in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(c} (1987). 
Petitioner advances the case of Midwestern Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Wisconsin Dep'u of Revenue, 267 N.W.2d 253 
(Wis. 1978) contending that the result of that case should be a 
governing principle in the present action. In that case, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, citing violation of the Commerce Clause as 
its rationale, held that a foreign gas company did not have 
sufficient "nexus" with the state of Wisconsin to justify taxation. 
While some of the facts in that case may be similar to facts in the 
present action, Petitioner's reliance on this case is misplaced. 
In the matter at hand, Petitioner has substantial contacts or 
"presence" within the state, unlike the foreign corporation in 
Midwestern Gas. Petitioner, Questar, is a Utah Corporation 
maintaining several places of business within the state. Moreover, 
Petitioner owns and operates a myriad of pipelines located within 
Utah. The Court in Midwestern was unable to ascertain minimum 
contacts to establish nexus for taxing power. On the contrary, 
Utah has no difficulty in establishing substantial "nexus" with 
Petitioner. Hence, Petitioner should be subject to properly 
administered use tax within the state. 
Further, Petitioner relies on National Bellas Hess, Inc. 
v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), wherein the court 
held that the state of Illinois may not "impose the duty of use tax 
collection and payments upon a seller whose only connection with 
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customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States 
mail." Id. at 758. That case does not govern the present fact 
situation. Petitioner's contacts with the state of Utah are not as 
minimal or insignificant as a connection through the United States 
mail. Petitioner has substantial contacts with the state; most 
notably corporate office and natural gas pipelines which clearly 
establish the requisite nexus for the imposition of a use tax on 
Petitioner's natural gas consumption. 
Since the Petitioner concedes that the additional tests 
of Complete Auto have been satisfied there is no need for a 
discussion of them. 
Finally, Petitioner asserts that the gas does not "come 
to rest" in Utah but is still in the stream of interstate commerce 
and that should be a significant factor in determ^ning nexus. 
There isr however, no evidence in Complete Auto or its 
progeny that indicates that the "comes to rest" element has any 
bearing on Commerce Clause analysis. D.H. Holmes c]early disposed 
of this issue when staled: 
... it really makes littTe difference tor the 
Commerce Clause purpose whether appellant's 
catalogs "came to rest" in the mailboxes of 
its Louisiana customers or whether they were 
still considered in the stream of interstate 
commerce. This distinction may be of some 
importance for other purposes (in 
determining; for instance, whether a 'taxable 
moment has occurred, see 505 So. 2d, at 105), 
but for Commerce Clause analysis it is largely 
irrelevant. 
Holmes, 486 U.S. at 31. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's out-of-state purchase of natural gas for in-
state use is not exempt from use tax pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-103(1)(c) (1987). Further, in accordance with Complete Auto 
and its progeny, Petitioner is responsible for payment of the tax 
because (J) Petitioner's naturaroas activity which has substantial 
nexus with the state of Utah; (2) it is fairly apportioned; (3) it 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) it is 
fairly related to the services provided by the State of Utah. 
Therefore, the findings and conclusions of the Utah State 
Tax Commission should be sustained and the tax assessment upheld. 
II t 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \lj ' day of November, 1990. 
Assts^ant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cerrify that I caused to be hand delivered, four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the 
I, t/ 
following on this WD ' day of November, 1990. 
Gary G. Sackett 
Division Counsel 
Questar Pipeline Co. 
180 East First South 
P. O. Box 11368 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX A 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
QUESTAR PIPELINE CO., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act for a formal 
hearing on February 16, 1989 before James E. Harward, Presiding 
Officer. Petitioner was represented by Gary G. Sackett, 
Attorney. Respondent was represented by L. A. Dever, Assistant 
Attorney General. 
After reviewing the evidence and arguments of the parties 
in the record and the^recommendation of the presiding officer, the 
Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 88-1670 
2. The period in question is July 1, 1984 through June 
30, 1987. 
3. The Petitioner is a Utah corporation and is an 
interstate natural gas pipeline company that purchases, stores, 
transports, and sells for resale natural gas in northwest 
Colorado, southwest Wyoming, and Utah. 
4. Petitioner is classified as a "natural gas company" 
under Section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act* of 1938, 15 U.S.C. 
Section 717(b), and its operations are subject: to the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1987 and to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
5. Petitioner makes sales for resale at numerous points 
in Wyoming and in Utah to its local distribution company affiliate 
in Utah, Mountain Fuel Supply Company. Petitioner also provides 
natural gas transportation services through its pipeline system 
for a wide variety of transportation customers. Petitioner also 
owns three underground natural gas storage reservoirs in Utah. 
The Chalk Creek and Coalville reservoirs are used solely in 
connection with the operation of Petitioner's interstate system. 
The third reservoir, Clay Basin storage field, is used for 
Petitioner's system and also to provide gas storage services to an 
independent contracting party, Northwest Pipeline Corporation. 
6. Petitioner purchases its natural gas from field 
producers and pipelines in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah, and takes 
delivery of gas owned by other parties for transportation to 
various points on its system. 
-2-
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7. Petitioner's pipeline system also includes several 
compressor facilities which Petitioner owns, maintains, and 
operates that are u£ed to compress gas for transmission and for 
underground storage injection. The compressor stations located in 
Utah are the Fidlar station, a mainline compressor facility, the 
Clay Basin storage compressor and small compressors associated 
with the Coalville and Chalk Creek storage reservoirs. An 
additional compressor, the Ferron compressor, was purchased by 
Petitioner after the audit period in question. These compressors 
are fueled by natural gas which is diverted directly from the 
flowing gas in Petitioner's pipeline system to the engines that 
drive the compressors. This diverted gas is either gas that 
Petitioner has purchased for resale to Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company or is gas that is being transported by Petitioner on 
behalf of its transportation customers. This gas to fuel the 
compressors is not sold or otherwise transferred by Petitioner to 
any other entity. This is the gas that is in question in this 
case. It is not physically separated and stored for later use, 
nor does it in any way "come to rest" before it is consumed in the 
compressors. The natural gas that is so consumed constitutes 
approximately 0.5 percent of the total natural gas stream which 
flows through Petitioner's pipelines. 
8. It is the contention of Petitioner that the gas 
consumed by the compressors is not subject to sales and use tax in 
Utah because the Commerce Clause of the United States Ccnstitution 
prohibits the state from imposing the tax on that use of natural 
gas . 
-3-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-103(1)(c) provides: 
(1) There is levied a tax upon the purchaser 
for the amount paid or charged for the 
following: . . . . 
(c) Gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel 
oil, or other fuel sold or furnished for 
commercial consumption. 
Under the provisions of this statute the gas used in 
Petitioner's compressors would be subject to sales and use tax in 
Utah. Petitioner contends, however, that this statute is 
preempted by the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. An analysis of this contention 
now follows. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(12) states that "sales or 
use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing under 
the Constitution or laws of the United States" is exempted from 
sales and use tax. 
3. Tax Commission Rule R865-21-16U provides: 
A. The fact that tangible personal property 
is purchased in interstate or foreign 
commerce does not exempt the property from 
the tax if the property is stored, used, 
or otherwise consumed within this state 
after the shipment in interstate or 
foreign commerce has ended. 
B. The fact that tangible personal property 
is used in this state in interstate or 
foreign commerce following its storage in 
this state does not exempt the storage of 
the property from tax. The fact that 
tangible personal property is used in this 
state in interstate or foreign commerce 
does not exempt the use of the property 
from the tax. 
-4-
This rule was adopted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107. 
4. Petitioner contends that the Commerce Clause and 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(12) control over R865-21-16U pursuant 
to the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the United States 
Constitution. An analysis of the case law is necessary to 
determine the validity of this contention. 
5. Both parties agree that the controlling case is 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 
51 L.Ed 2d 326 (1977). This^case articulates a four part test to 
determine whether taxation of property by a state is proper under 
the Commerce Clause. This four part test is: 
(1) Is the activity sufficiently connected to the state 
to justify the tax? 
(2) Is the tax fairly related to benefits provided to 
the taxpayer by the state? 
(3) Is the tax discriminatory against interstate 
commerce? 
(4) Is the tax fairly apportioned? 
See 430 U.S. at 287. Complete Auto and its progeny provide the 
standards by which this case must be analyzed. 
6. Both parties agree that the third and fourth prongs, 
the nondiscrimination and the apportionment prongs, do not apply 
as issues in this case. Therefore, the analysis must focus on the 
first two prongs, the nexus and the benefits received prongs. 
-5-
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7. One of the principal cases upon which Petitioner 
relies is Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. Wisconsin Department 
of Revenue, 84 Wis. 2d 261, 267 N.W. 2d 253 (1978). This case has 
a factual pattern almost identical to the case now before the Tax 
Commission. In that case, the taxpayer was an interstate pipeline 
company that purchased its natural gas from outside of Wisconsin 
and sold it to customers within that state. The pipeline 
operations included two compressors located within Wisconsin that, 
as in this case, took gas from the pipeline stream in order to 
fuel the compressors. The Midwestern Gas court found that 
although the operation of the compressors and the diversion of the 
gas to fuel them occurred within the state of Wisconsin, yet that 
consumption was such an integral part of the process of interstate 
commerce, which did not have a substantial nexus with the state of 
Wisconsin, that this activity was not taxable by Wisconsin. In 
coming to this conclusion, that court relied in part upon the 
"comes to rest" doctrine enunciated in Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe 
Line Co. v. Michigan, 227 N.W. 2d 334 (Mich. 1975); Texas Eastern 
Corp. v. Benson, 480 S.W. 2d 905 (Tenn. 1972); Texas Gas 
Transmission Corp. v.-Benson, 444 S.W. 2d 137 (Tenn. 1969), which 
essentially means that one of the criteria for determining whether 
there is a substantial nexus with a particular state is whether 
the commodity, in this case natural gas, comes to rest within the 
state at any particular time or whether it continues on without 
stopping in the interstate stream of commerce. Petitioner argues 
under the language of these cases that the consumption of the gas 
to fuel the compressors which keep the natural gas moving in 
-6-
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interstate commerce is indistinguishable from interstate commerce, 
and therefore is not subject to the sales and use tax since no 
substantial nexus is present. 
8. Petitioner also cites Goldberg v. Sweet/ 488 
U.S. , 109 S.Ct. 582, 102 L.Ed 607 (1989). This case involved 
the taxation of interstate phone calls which Petitioner asserts is 
analogous to the interstate transportion of natural gas. The 
Supreme Court in Goldberg determined that under the facts of that 
case the taxation was proper. Petitioner in support of its case 
refers to some language within Goldberg which states: "We also 
doubt that termination of an interstate phone call, by itself, 
provides a substantial enough nexus for a state to tax a call." 
Relying upon this language, Petitioner states that the natural gas 
in question merely terminates within Utah, but that it is not 
necessarily ultimately committed to commerce within this state, no 
one within the state other than Petitioner is ever involved with 
that gas and the gas is used only in the interstate operation of 
Petitioner's pipeline system. Therefore, according to Petitioner, 
since the gas in question only terminates in Utah like the phone 
calls in Goldberg, under the dicta in that case the gas is not 
taxable in Utah. 
9. The Tax Commission finds that Petitioner's analysis 
is deficient. Not only does the gas in question terminate within 
the state of Utah, but also some of it originates within the state 
of Utah. This was apparently not the case in Midwestern Gas. 
Once the gas that does originate in Utah enters Petitioner's 
pipeline it becomes indistinguishable from that which is carried 
-7-
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in interstate commerce. It is fair to conclude that while some of 
the gas that fuels the compressors does not originate in Utah, yet 
some of it does originate in Utah and is, therefore, taxable. 
This establishes a much clearer nexus between Petitioner's 
operations and the state than a case where the gas would merely 
terminate within the state. Moreover, Midwestern Gas relies in 
part upon the "comes to rest" doctrine which has been discredited 
by the Supreme Court as no longer applicable or relevant under the 
four part test of Complete Auio. D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. McNamara, 
108 S.Ct. 1619 (1988). The court in D.H. Holmes held essentially 
that the distinction between the "comes to rest" doctrine and 
whether or not the goods are still in the interstate commerce 
stream is largely irrelevant in Commerce Clause analysis. It is 
also a fact that Petitioner is not a foreign corporation as was 
the corporation involved in Midwestern Gas, but Petitioner is a 
Utah Corporation and, therefore, has substantially more nexus than 
was the case in Midwestern Gas. 
10. Another case that the Tax Commission finds 
persuasive is National Geographic Society v. California Board of 
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 97 S.Ct. 1386, 51 L.Ed. 2d 631 
(1977). In that case the Supreme Court ruled that the maintenance 
of two of Petitioner's offices in the state of California was 
sufficient nexus between the National Geographic Society and 
California to render the Society's activities taxable in that 
state. The nexus, therefore, under National Geographic is not 
only between the activity which is sought to be taxed and the 
-8-
state but also the person or entity that the state is seeking to 
tax and the state, and the activity which the state is trying to 
tax is not the only activity that can be used to determine the 
nexus question. 
11- Although neither party argues substantially 
regarding the second prong of the Complete Auto test, that the tax 
must be fairly related to benefits provided to the taxpayer from 
the state, that issue still remains unresolved and will now be 
dealt with. It is clear that Petitioner's compressors located 
within Utah as well as Petitioner's other facilities located 
within the state all enjoy the usual and traditional public 
services provided by the state of Utah, and also have benefit of 
the protection of the state laws and legal system. 
12. Under the above analysis, the Tax Commission finds 
that Petitioner, through its activities in conducting the 
operations of the pipeline and compressors, does have a 
substantial nexus with the state so that the gas used to fuel 
those compressors is subject to Utah's use tax. The tax is also 
fairly related to the benefits that Utah provides to Petitioner. 
Since the other two prongs of the Complete Auto test are not being 
contested by the Petitioner, it is clear under this analysis that 
the tax in question does satisfy the Complete Auto test and is 
therefore valid under the United States Constitution and the laws 
of the state of Utah. 
-9-
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DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order of 
the Utah State Tax Commission that the gas used to fuel 
Petitioner's compressors within the state of Utah is subject to 
the state's use tax and Petitioner's request is denied. 
DATED this _j2^day of (_\ S?X* I 1990. f 
BY ORI)ER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
lansen 
Chairman 
Poe B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Dav 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have ten (10) days after the date of the 
to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a petition for 
judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-13(l), 63-46b-14(2) (a) . 
JGL/lgh/8848w 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
^Questar Pipeline Co. 
c/o Gary G. Sackett 
180 East First South Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div. 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Sam Vong 
Operations, Central Files 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
DATED this \lff^ day of X/2\* X , 1990. 
V 
il^Z  Qr^y
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APPENDIX B 
DRAFT 1 
J-anuary 9, 1989 
BEFORE THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY 
(formerly known as Mountain 
Fuel Resources, I n c . ) , 
Petitioner, 
v, 
AUDITING DIVISION, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
To expedite the disposition of the proceedings in the captioned 
case, Questar Pipeline Company (Questar Pipeline) and the Auditing 
Division of the State Tax Commission of Utah (Auditing Division) st ipu-
late to the following facts. 
,1 . Questar Pipeline is an interstate natural gas pipeline 
company that purchases, stores, t ranspor ts and makes sales for resale of 
natural gas in northwest Colorado, southwest Wyoming and Utah. A 
schematic diagram of the Company's pipeline system is attached as Ap-
pendix A. 
2. Questar Pipeline is a "natural gas company" under § 1(b) 
of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U . S . C . § 717(b), and its operations 
Prior to March 7, 1988, Questar Pipeline Company was known as 
Mountain Fuel Resources, Inc. The name change in March 1988 did not 
involve any operational, organizational, affiliational or any other change 
or change in its tax status. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
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are subject to the jur isd ic t ion of the Federa l Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC). Cer ta in of i t s ope ra t ions are also subject to the Natural 
Gas Policy Act of 1978, which is admin i s t e red by the FERC. 
/ o . The FERC r e g u l a t e s the ins ta l la t ion, operation and a b a n -
donment of Ques ta r Pipel ine 's facilit ies to the extent they are used in 
ca r ry ing out the following ope ra t i ons tha t a re also subject to the j u r i s -
diction of tha t commission: 
• (yZfl Sales for r e s a l e . Ques ta r Pipeline makes sales for 
resale ( i . e . , sales of gas at wholesale) to its local d is t r ibut ion 
company affiliate, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, at numerous sales 
points in Utah and Wyoming. 
(b) T r a n s p o r t a t i o n s e r v i c e s . Questar Pipeline p rov ides 
na tu ra l gas t r a n s p o r t a t i o n be tween numerous points on i ts system 
on behalf of a wide v a r i e t y of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n cus tomers , including 
p r o d u c e r s , e n d - u s e r s , o the r local d i s t r ibu t ion companies and gas 
market ing companies . 
(c )^ S t o r a g e . Ques t a r Pipeline owns th ree u n d e r g r o u n d 
na tura l gas s to rage r e s e r v o i r s in Utah tha t are used in connection 
with the se rv ices tha t it p r o v i d e s p u r s u a n t to various FERC cer t i f i -
cates and o the r FERC a u t h o r i t y . The Chalk Creek and Coalville 
'A 
s torage r e s e r v o i r s a re u s e d solely in connect ion l the operat ion of 
Ques tar Pipel ine 's i n t e r s t a t e s y s t e m . A th i rd Utah r e s e r v o i r , the 
Clay Basin s t o r age field, is u s e d for Ques t a r ' s system and also to 
p rov ide gas s to rage s e rv i ce to an independen t contract ing p a r t y 
(Northwest Pipeline C o r p o r a t i o n ) . 
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/ . Ques ta r Pipeline p u r c h a s e s na tu ra l gas from pipel ines and 
field p r o d u c e r s , in Wyoming, Colorado and Utah, and t akes del ivery of 
gas owned by o the r p a r t i e s for t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and rede l ive ry of t ha t gas 
at v a r i o u s po in t s on i t s sys t em. As an in teg ra l p a r t of i t s n a t u r a l gas 
p ipe l ine sys t em, Ques ta r Pipeline o w n s , maintains and o p e r a t e s severa l 
compressor facilities t ha t are u s e d to compress gas for t ransmiss ion and 
u n d e r g r o u n d s to rage injection p u r p o s e s . The compressor s ta t ions locat -
ed in Utah are shown on Append ix A: Fidlar Station (in n o r t h e a s t 
U t a h ) , a mainline compressor faci l i ty, Clay Basin s to rage c o m p r e s s o r s , 
and small compressors associated with the Chalk Creek and Coalville 
s t o r age r e s e r v o i r s . The "Fer ron Compres so r , " a small un i t shown on 
the lower left of Appendix A, was p u r c h a s e d by Ques ta r Pipeline af ter 
t he audi t per iod in this p r o c e e d i n g . 
/ £ . The fuel u sed in each of Ques ta r P ipe l ined compressors is 
n a t u r a l gas and is d ive r t ed d i rec t ly from the flowing gas in the Compa-
n y ' s pipel ine sys tem. 
— £ . The gas used in the Company 's compressors is d ive r t ed 
d i rec t ly from the pipeline gas s t ream and cons i s t s of gas tha t e i t h e r : 
(a) Ques tar Pipeline has p u r c h a s e d for i t s system supp ly 
for resa le to Mountain Fuel Supply Company, or 
fc>) Is made avai lable , p u r s u a n t to FERC-approved tariff 
p rov is ions and serv ice c o n t r a c t s , from gas volumes tha t a re being 
t r a n s p o r t e d b y Ques ta r Pipeline on behalf of t r anspo r t a t i on cus tom-
e r s . 
^7. The compressor- fue l gas is not the subject of a sale or 
any i n t r aco rpo ra t e t r a n s f e r . The gas is owned by Ques ta r Pipeline as 
- 3 -
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part of its system supply or it is gas that belonged to an individual 
shipper^ ^m=^KS UgriiLdled FERC appiuvud aiuuuiil^ diniLtly—fen—use a<T 
Lonpnuaor £ital—ia-—fl^Hwiimi mith Th^  Traweppi-nlMn ..r »^.« i , 
r^gc-liveiy 10 Lhat tranapegter^ 
} <8. The gas in question is not physically separated and stored 
for later use nor does it "come to resttr before its consumption. It is 
directly diverted from the moving -stream and injected into the compres-
sor fuel system for combustion purposes. 
WHEREFORE, Questar Pipeline and the Auditing Division stipu-
late to the foregoing facts for all purposes in this proceeding and any 
subsequent judicial review of this proceeding. 
Respectfully submitted, 
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY 
><xJb%x 
AUDITING DIVISION, 
UTAH TAX COMMISSION 
OH Assist&J*t Attorney General 
J a r ^ r i 9, 1989 
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